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abstract.  The coronavirus pandemic has forced us to reckon with the possibility of having 
to ration life-saving medical treatments. In response, many health systems have employed proto-
cols that explicitly de-prioritize people for these treatments based on pre-existing disabilities. This 
Essay argues that such protocols violate the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation 
Act, and the Affordable Care Act. Such explicit discrimination on its face violates these statutes. 
Nor can medical providers simply define disabled patients as being “unqualified” because of disa-
bilities that do not affect the ability to ameliorate the condition for which treatment is sought. A 
proper interpretation of the law may permit medical providers to use disability as a basis for a 
rationing decision where an individual’s underlying disability will kill the individual in the imme-
diate term regardless of the treatment. However, as this Essay demonstrates, those circumstances 
will be narrow. Further, the law requires that such imminent-death determinations will be made 
based on the best available objective evidence, free from both bias against people with disabilities 
and devaluation of their lives. 
introduction 
For years, conflicts over medical rationing have preoccupied participants in 
healthcare debates. But they have tended to take place in the abstract—as in dis-
cussions of what treatments will be covered under various healthcare reform pro-
posals that may or may not pass. In many cases, discussions of these issues have 
tended to the demagogic—as in the trumped-up furor over the supposed 
Obamacare “death panels.” 
Due to the coronavirus pandemic, the threat of medical rationing has become 
much more present. As the virus spreads throughout the United States, provid-
ers in various areas have found themselves lacking adequate medical facilities 
and equipment to handle the predicted number of cases. Hospitals faced with a 
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crush of patients must confront questions of how to allocate scarce resources—
notably, life-saving ventilators—at a time of severe shortage. Although our 
health systems seemed to weather the first wave of the COVID-19 outbreak 
without resort to overt rationing, it still seems far more possible than in the past 
that we will be in the triage situation that the law, bioethics, and policy literature 
typically merely hypothesizes.1 Should that come to pass, medical providers will 
truly be in a position to choose who shall live and who shall die.2 
After the H1N1 outbreak in 2009, the Institute of Medicine urged states, in 
advance of the next pandemic, to adopt “crisis standards of care.”3 These stand-
ards were intended to guide how medical professionals would allocate their re-
sources in times of “a substantial change in usual healthcare operations and the 
level of care it is possible to deliver, which is made necessary by a pervasive (e.g., 
pandemic influenza) or catastrophic (e.g., earthquake, hurricane) disaster.”4 
Many states took up the call. 
Unfortunately, the crisis standards of care adopted by hospitals and state 
agencies often employ explicit disability-based distinctions. Until the Office for 
Civil Rights (OCR) at the United States Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices (HHS) intervened in April 2020, Alabama maintained crisis standards of 
care that “allowed for denying ventilator services to individuals based on the 
presence of intellectual disabilities, including ‘profound mental retardation’ and 
‘moderate to severe dementia.’”5 Tennessee still lists “people with spinal muscu-
lar atrophy who need assistance with activities of daily living” as among those 
 
1. For examples of earlier discussions in the literature, see James F. Blumstein, Rationing Medical 
Resources: A Constitutional, Legal, and Policy Analysis, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1345 (1981); Maxwell J. 
Mehlman, Rationing Expensive Lifesaving Medical Treatments, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 239; Govind 
Persad, Alan Wertheimer & Ezekiel J Emanuel, Principles for Allocation of Scarce Medical Inter-
ventions, 373 LANCET 423 (2009); and Douglas B. White et al., Who Should Receive Life Support 
During a Public Health Emergency? Using Ethical Principles to Improve Allocation Decisions, 150 
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 132 (2009). 
2. Another area in which these debates have not been merely abstract has involved practices gov-
erning organ transplantation. Perhaps unsurprisingly, similar disability discrimination issues 
have begun to percolate in that area in recent years. See Organ Transplant Discrimination 
Against People with Disabilities, NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY (Sept. 25, 2019), https://ncd 
.gov/sites/default/files/NCD_Organ_Transplant_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/RE26-
CVWC]. 
3. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, GUIDANCE FOR ESTABLISHING CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE FOR USE IN 
DISASTER SITUATIONS: A LETTER REPORT 3 (2009). 
4. Id. 
5. HHS Press Office, OCR Reaches Early Case Resolution with Alabama After It Removes Discrimi-
natory Ventilator Triaging Guidelines, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Apr. 8, 2020), 
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/04/08/ocr-reaches-early-case-resolution-alabama-
after-it-removes-discriminatory-ventilator-triaging.html [https://perma.cc/L9XX-DCAN]. 
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who will not receive critical care in a situation of scarcity.6 The University of 
Washington Medical Center’s guidelines provide that the goal in a crisis situa-
tion should be “[o]verall survival,” defined as “healthy, long-term survival, rec-
ognizing that this represents weighting the survival of young otherwise healthy 
patients more heavily than that of older, chronically debilitated patients.”7 
Guidelines promulgated by Washington State provide that, in deciding whether 
to administer life-saving treatment to an individual, hospitals should look to the 
individual’s “baseline [pre-coronavirus] functional status” and should accord-
ingly “consider [pre-existing] loss of reserves in energy, physical ability, cogni-
tion and general health.”8 
Like the now-withdrawn Alabama policy, the Tennessee and Washington 
protocols, as well as similar ones in Kansas, Pennsylvania, Utah, and New York, 
have recently prompted state and national disability rights organizations, as well 
as individuals with disabilities, to file administrative complaints with OCR. The 
complaints allege that these and other provisions violate the federal disability 
discrimination laws.9 Although OCR resolved the Alabama complaint after the 
state withdrew its policy,10 and issued more general guidance addressing the is-
sue,11 the other complaints remain pending. And the broader issue remains a live 
one. 
In this Essay, written as this crisis unfolds, I argue that disability-based dis-
tinctions like these do indeed violate the law. The Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and the Affordable Care Act (ACA) all pro-
hibit healthcare providers from discriminating against qualified individuals with 
 
6. Ari Ne’eman, “‘I Will Not Apologize for My Needs,’” N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www 
.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/opinion/coronavirus-ventilators-triage-disability.html [https:// 
perma.cc/VBK9-5LT4]. See the discussion in Letter from Lisa Primm, Disability Rights 
Tenn., to Roger Severino, Dir., Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. 
(Mar. 27, 2020), http://thearc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/2020-03-27-TN-OCR 
-Complaint-re-Healthcare-Rationing-Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/ACT4-BMPX]. 
7. Letter from David Carlson, Disability Rights Wash., to Roger Severino, Dir., Office for Civil 
Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. 12 (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www 
.centerforpublicrep.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/OCR-Complaint_3-23-20-final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KD72-Z8CS] (quoting the hospital’s policy). 
8. Id. at 13 (quoting the policy). 
9. See id. The Center for Public Representation maintains an updated website compiling these 
complaints. See COVID-19 Medical Rationing, CTR. FOR PUB. REPRESENTATION, https:// 
www.centerforpublicrep.org/covid-19-medical-rationing [https://perma.cc/R37B-QJ85]. I 
am among the counsel to the complainants in several of these matters. 
10. See HHS Press Office, supra note 5. 
11. See Office for Civil Rights, Bulletin: Civil Rights, HIPAA, and the Coronavirus Disease 2019 
(COVID-19), U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Mar. 28, 2020), https:// 
www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr-bulletin-3-28-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/QL3K-NPZE]. 
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disabilities because of their disabilities. The explicit discrimination embodied in 
policies like those of Washington State, on its face, violates these prohibitions. 
Nor can medical providers simply define disabled patients as being “unqualified” 
because of disabilities that do not make them unable to benefit from treatment 
for the condition that they seek to ameliorate. Longstanding and authoritative 
interpretations of the law bar the use of such circular techniques to insulate dis-
ability discrimination from legal challenge. 
A proper interpretation of the law may permit medical providers to use dis-
ability as a basis for a rationing decision where an individual’s underlying disa-
bility makes the individual unable to benefit from coronavirus treatment—either 
because that disability interferes with the treatment itself, or because the under-
lying disability will kill the individual in the very near term regardless of the 
treatment’s success in addressing the virus. But those circumstances will be nar-
row. And a proper interpretation of the law requires assurances that such immi-
nent-death determinations will be made based on the best available objective ev-
idence, free from bias against people with disabilities or devaluation of their 
lives. 
Under this interpretation of the law, which I argue is the best interpretation 
of the existing legal materials, medical providers would retain substantial dis-
cretion to make resource-allocation decisions in a time of triage. They could 
make decisions based on non-disability factors. And where those factors do not 
dictate a decision, health systems would not be limited to a first-come, first-
served approach. They could employ any other disability-neutral procedure that 
fits their professional judgment. Even a lottery would be fairer and more demo-
cratically legitimate than placing the burden on disabled individuals—individu-
als who already experience disadvantage as a result of societal discrimination, 
and who disproportionately lack access to the political and health-system pro-
cesses that frame policies concerning medical rationing. But my point is not to 
defend a lottery or any other allocation procedure. Rather, my point is to argue 
that the law, best understood, rules out a protocol that puts disabled people at 
the back of the line because they have pre-existing medical conditions that do 
not make them unable to benefit from the treatment they seek. 
In this Essay, I defend that reading of the law. Part I demonstrates that prac-
tices that expressly use disability as a factor in denying life-saving treatment dis-
criminate because of a disability. Part II argues that it would be inconsistent with 
the law for a health system to treat a pre-existing disability as rendering an in-
dividual un-”qualified” for treatment for a new condition—at least where the 
pre-existing condition does not make the individual unable to benefit from the 
treatment. And Part III addresses the one significant body of legal precedent that 
might at first glance appear to stand in the way of these conclusions—the “Baby 
who gets the ventilator? 
5 
Doe” cases. As that Part shows, those cases conflict with more recent, authorita-
tive developments in the law. And they do not apply to the COVID-19 situation 
even on their own terms. 
i .  discrimination because of disability 
There are three major federal statutes that prohibit disability discrimination 
in the medical treatment context: the ADA; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act; and Section 1557 of the ACA. The ADA prohibits disability-based discrimi-
nation by state and local government agencies in its Title II,12 and it prohibits 
disability-based discrimination by private healthcare providers in its Title III.13 
Section 504 prohibits disability-based discrimination by federal executive-
branch agencies and recipients of federal financial assistance.14 And Section 1557 
prohibits disability-based discrimination by health programs that receive federal 
financial assistance or are operated under a federal program or activity.15 
Despite some slight variations in language, each of these statutes prohibits 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities because of their disabilities. 
And except for ADA Title III, all require that the disabled individual be “quali-
fied” for the benefit or treatment they seek. ADA Title II provides that “no qual-
ified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability,” be “subjected 
to discrimination” by a state or local government.16 Title III of the same statute 
says that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability 
in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, ad-
vantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation.”17 Section 
504 phrases the prohibition in this way: “No otherwise qualified individual with 
a disability” shall, “solely by reason of her or his disability,” be “subjected to dis-
crimination under” a federally assisted program.18 And Section 1557 incorporates 
by reference the discrimination prohibition in Section 504.19 
This Essay raises two interpretive issues relevant to medical-rationing deci-
sions. First, are those decisions being made “by reason of” or “on the basis of” 
 
12. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2018). 
13. Id. § 302, 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2018); see Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 629 (1998) (stating 
that Title III’s definition of a covered “public accommodation” includes a private healthcare 
provider). 
14. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2018). 
15. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1557(a), 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2018). 
16. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 
17. Id. § 12182(a). 
18. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). 
19. 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a). 
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disability? Second, are the disabled individuals affected by those decisions “qual-
ified” for the treatment they seek? I deal with the issue of qualification in Part II 
of this Essay. Here, I briefly discuss the issue of discrimination because of disa-
bility. 
Many of the rationing protocols healthcare providers have been preparing to 
use in response to COVID-19 plainly inflict discrimination “by reason of” or “on 
the basis of” disability. Disability is an explicit factor used to deny treatment—a 
factor that will be decisive in many cases.20 The protocols raise none of the diffi-
cult issues that often stymie claims of disability discrimination: identifying dis-
criminatory intent, determining appropriate reasonable accommodations, or de-
limiting the scope of the prohibition on disparate impact.21 Rather, they are 
straightforward examples of making treatment decisions because of disability. 
The harder question, to which I now turn, is that of qualification. 
i i .  are disabled individuals “qualified” for life-saving 
treatment? 
The major disability rights statutes generally limit their protection to “qual-
ified” individuals with disabilities. ADA Title II defines a “qualified” individual 
as someone “who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or 
practices,” meets “the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services 
or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.”22 The 
Rehabilitation Act does not contain text defining “qualified” (or “otherwise qual-
ified,” the language used by Section 504), but cases under the statute apply a 
similar rule: an individual is “otherwise qualified” if that individual is able, with 
 
20. See supra text accompanying notes 6-8. Section 504, unlike the ADA, requires proof of dis-
crimination “solely by reason of” disability. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Where disability status is the 
determinative factor in a decision, the courts have treated the “solely” requirement as satisfied. 
For example, in Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1053 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 
1105 (2003), the court concluded that the state violated Section 504 even though it was not 
the plaintiffs’ disability alone, but instead their disability combined with the failure to satisfy 
a “restrictive income and assets test,” that led to their exclusion from Medicaid. “[B]ut for 
their disability,” the court explained, the plaintiffs would have received Medicaid under the 
state’s QUEST program. Id. As a result, “those disabled persons were denied QUEST coverage 
by the State solely because of their disabilities; that is, had they been nondisabled, they would 
have received QUEST coverage.” Id. 
21. For an argument that medical rationing—even if not based on explicit disability classifica-
tions—is illegal when it has a forbidden disparate impact on disabled people, see Deborah 
Hellman & Kate Nicholson, Rationing and Disability in a State of Crisis (Va. Pub. Law and Legal 
Theory Research Paper No. 2020-33, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3570088 [https:// 
perma.cc/6349-BGS8]. 
22. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 201(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2018). 
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“reasonable accommodation” if necessary, to perform the “essential functions” of 
the job or meet the eligibility requirements for a program.23 
A. The General Rule: Disability as Such May Not Be a Basis for 
Disqualification 
The most plausible legal defense of disability-based medical-rationing rules 
is that the affected individuals’ disabilities render them un-”qualified” for the 
life-saving treatment they seek. In times of triage—for example, when there are 
not enough ventilators and other resources to go around—a health system needs 
to deny these resources to some people who need them to survive. So long as 
medical professionals adopt reasonable criteria for making these sorts of tragic 
choices,24 the argument would go, those criteria should constitute the qualifica-
tions for the relevant benefit. And here, the argument would continue, it is rea-
sonable to choose people without underlying disabilities in rationing these scarce 
resources, because they would benefit more from receiving life-saving treatment. 
They would (by hypothesis) live longer lives afterwards, they would enjoy their 
lives more, and they would contribute more economically to society. 
Whatever one thinks as a philosophical or policy matter about rationing 
treatment based on quality-adjusted life years—an issue on which there is con-
tentious debate25—the argument that medical professionals can simply define 
disability as disqualifying seems directly foreclosed by legal precedent. In Alex-
ander v. Choate, one of its early cases under Section 504, the Supreme Court rec-
ognized that states could not permissibly evade the bar on disability discrimina-
tion simply by turning the absence of a disability into a qualification for a job or 
benefit: “Antidiscrimination legislation can obviously be emptied of meaning if 
every discriminatory policy is ‘collapsed’ into one’s definition of what is the rel-
evant benefit.”26 Thus, the Court held that “[t]he benefit itself, of course, cannot 
 
23. Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287-88 n.17 (1987) (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k) (1985)). As 
noted above, Section 1557 incorporates Section 504’s discrimination prohibition by reference. 
ADA Title III, notably, includes no “qualified” limitation. 
24. The obligatory citation is to GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978). 
25. For a disability-focused critique, see Quality-Adjusted Life Years and the Devaluation of Life with 
Disability, NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY (Nov. 6, 2019), https://ncd.gov/sites/default 
/files/NCD_Quality_Adjusted_Life_Report_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2V6-4NX4]. For a 
nice summary of the ethical literature on the problematic nature of relying on quality-adjusted 
life-years (QALYs) in this way, see Jerome Bickenbach, Disability and Health Care Rationing, 
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring 2016), https://plato.stanford 
.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/disability-care-rationing [https://perma.cc/ABU7-NUUS]. 
26. 469 U.S. 287, 301 n.21 (1985) (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 29 n.36, 469 U.S. at 301 (No. 83-727)). 
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be defined in a way that effectively denies otherwise qualified handicapped indi-
viduals the meaningful access to which they are entitled.”27 
To adopt the absence of an underlying disability as a qualification for receiv-
ing life-saving treatment would, at least on its face, appear to conflict with that 
principle. The disability discrimination laws appear to erect a strong rule that 
disability as such may never be the basis for denying individuals opportunities. 
To be sure, an individual’s disability may make it impossible or impracticable 
for them to satisfy certain eligibility criteria, even if the criteria are defined with 
no reference to disability. For example, a state may legitimately demand that bus 
drivers operate their vehicles safely; with current technology, blindness is simply 
inconsistent with that requirement. Safe operation of motor vehicles is an inter-
est that can be defined without any reference to disability. The recognition that 
some disabilities, given the current state of technology, are simply incompatible 
with that interest reflects a simple and uncontroversial empirical judgment. 
But disability in the medical-rationing context is different. Refusing to allo-
cate scarce treatment resources to patients with pre-existing disabilities does not 
rest on a simple and uncontroversial empirical question. It rests on a series of 
value judgments: what should we be seeking to maximize when we allocate 
scarce healthcare resources? Lives saved, quality of life, prospective economic 
output of those we save? How do we determine quality of life? Do impairments 
to physical or mental functions necessarily limit an individual’s quality of life? 
What if the people who experience those impairments do not think so?28 It is 
practically difficult, if not conceptually impossible, to disentangle our answers to 
those questions from our judgments about disability and the value of life with a 
disability.29 
Even when we answer what seem like the purely empirical questions here, 
our answers are likely to be inflected by our underlying views about disability 
and by overt or implicit biases against disabled people. Medical-rationing deci-
sions are made in times of great uncertainty.30 They involve prognoses about the 
 
27. Id. at 301. 
28. For a discussion of these issues, see infra text accompanying notes 46-53. 
29. Arti Rai argues, for example, that refusing to provide a liver transplant to a person who walks 
with a cane, out of a concern that an alternative recipient of the liver who has no underlying 
impairment will experience a higher quality of life, “would systematically allocate medical re-
sources away from all individuals with disabilities, no matter how amenable their other health 
difficulties were to medical treatment.” Arti Kaur Rai, Rationing Through Choice: A New Ap-
proach to Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in Health Care, 72 IND. L.J. 1015, 1080-81 (1997). Such a 
decision, although expressed in quality-of-life terms, would in fact betray a “much broader, 
highly problematic purpose of categorically judging all persons with disabilities less worthy 
than nondisabled persons of receiving any sort of medical treatment.” Id. at 1081. 
30. For this reason, the influential bioethicists who wrote a recent piece on COVID-19 and ra-
tioning in the New England Journal of Medicine argue that “[l]imited time and information 
who gets the ventilator? 
9 
possibility of recovery and the length and quality of life following recovery that 
are themselves uncertain. It is natural for anyone resolving those uncertainties 
under such conditions to be guided by their underlying values and biases, even 
if only unconsciously. And there is ample evidence of widespread bias against 
people with disabilities among medical professionals31—a problem that is exac-
erbated by the underrepresentation of disabled people among their ranks.32 
Philosophers could debate how we should answer these questions. Some, 
following the views of people like Peter Singer, might argue that many disabili-
ties inherently limit the quality of life and that the quality of life ought to be 
central in determining how we should allocate scarce societal resources.33 Others 
might take the view that national productivity is the most important factor. 34 
 
during an emergency . . . counsel against incorporating patients’ future quality of life, and 
quality-adjusted life-years, into benefit maximization.” Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., Fair Alloca-
tion of Scarce Medical Resources in the Time of Covid-19, NEW ENG. J. MED. (Mar. 23, 2020), 
https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMsb2005114 [https://perma.cc/S42H-3G59]. 
As I argue below, the same concerns that counsel against using quality-of-life measures to 
assess a treatment’s benefit also counsel against using quantity-of-life measures such as the 
number of expected life-years saved. See infra Section II.B.3. 
31. See, e.g., Carol J. Gill, Health Professionals, Disability, and Assisted Suicide: An Examination of 
Relevant Empirical Evidence and Reply to Batavia, 6 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 526, 530 (2000); 
Tom Shakespeare, Lisa I. Iezzoni & Nora E. Groce, Disability and the Training of Health Profes-
sionals, 374 LANCET 1815 (2009). See generally Medical Futility and Disability Bias, NAT’L COUN-
CIL ON DISABILITY 29 (Nov. 20, 2019), https://ncd.gov/sites/default/files/NCD_Medical 
_Futility_Report_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/MY63-33FZ] (“Several studies have demon-
strated that health care providers’ opinions about the quality of life of a person with a disabil-
ity significantly differ from the actual experiences of those people. For example, one study 
found that only 17 percent of providers anticipated an average or better quality of life after a 
spinal cord injury (SCI) compared with 86 percent of the actual SCI comparison group. The 
same study found that only 18 percent of emergency care providers imagined that they would 
be glad to be alive after experiencing a spinal cord injury, in contrast to the 92 percent of actual 
SCI survivors.” (footnotes omitted)); Letter from David Carlson to Roger Severino, supra 
note 7, at 8-11 (collecting extensive evidence of medical bias against disability). 
32. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Technical Standards and Lawsuits Involving Accommodations for Health 
Professions Students, 18 AMA J. ETHICS 1010, 1010 (2016). 
33. For Peter Singer’s views on using quality of life in resource-allocation decisions, see JOHN 
MCKIE, PETER SINGER, HELGA KUHSE & JEFF RICHARDSON, THE ALLOCATION OF HEALTH CARE 
RESOURCES: AN ETHICAL EVALUATION OF THE “QALY” APPROACH (Routledge ed. 1998). For 
Singer’s views on disability and the quality of life, see Peter Singer, Why We Must Ration 
Health Care, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (July 15, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/19 
/magazine/19healthcare-t.html [https://perma.cc/7YAY-AVZ5]. 
34. For a description, and critique, of this argument, see Andrew H. Smith & John Rother, Older 
Americans and the Rationing of Health Care, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1847, 1853 (1992) (“Some would 
justify the withholding of expensive medical services to older persons on the basis of the de-
creased productivity of the elderly.”). 
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Still others might disagree and argue that the quality of life is inherently subjec-
tive and that a purely productivity-focused view improperly reduces human be-
ings to nothing more than “embodied net marginal product.”35 
Wherever we might come down on the philosophical debate, the disability 
discrimination statutes resolve them for purposes of the law—at least insofar as 
the question is whether the absence of a disability can in and of itself be a quali-
fication for needed medical treatment. Congress decided to bar the use of disa-
bility, standing alone, as a (dis)qualification for the receipt of needed benefits 
from the government or other medical providers. That decision may have re-
flected a fear that disability-based decisions will reflect irrational bias, or perhaps 
some broader commitment to disability equality. The legislative history is not 
specific. But the crucial point is that Congress made the decision. 
One good reason to treat the disability discrimination laws as resolving these 
debates relates to democratic legitimacy. People with disabilities have faced a 
long history of exclusion from democratic participation.36 Often, that exclusion 
has been overt, as in the denial of the right to vote to those under guardianship.37 
Other times, the exclusion has resulted from an accumulation of decisions that 
made it impossible for many disabled people to have access to the political pro-
cess.38 When government institutions make decisions that deny people with dis-
abilities important benefits, we should worry that those decisions lack legiti-
macy. They were likely taken without the equal participation of those who are 
the most affected. We should especially worry when the immediate conse-
quences of those decisions are life and death. 
By contrast, the political process that led to the enactment of the disability 
discrimination laws did not exclude the nondisabled. As a group, the nondisa-
bled are more likely to lose out from a move that denies medical providers the 
ability to make disability disqualifying for scarce life-saving treatments. When a 
group passes a law to put burdens on itself, there is little reason to worry that it 
 
35. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics of 
(Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 876-80 (2003). The phrase “embodied net mar-
ginal product” comes from Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 
833, 835 (2001). 
36. For a good discussion of the history of disability-based restrictions on the right to vote, see 
Kay Schriner, Lisa Ochs & Todd Shields, Democratic Dilemmas: Notes on the ADA and Voting 
Rights of People with Cognitive and Emotional Impairments, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 437 
(2000). 
37. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disability, Universalism, Social Rights, and Citizenship, 39 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 413, 423-24 (2017). 
38. See Matt Vasilogambros, How Voters with Disabilities Are Blocked from the Ballot Box, PEW CHAR-
ITABLE TRS. (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs 
/stateline/2018/02/01/how-voters-with-disabilities-are-blocked-from-the-ballot-box 
[https://perma.cc/F6GM-MVYA]. 
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is failing to take account of the full array of costs.39 Perhaps it is best to think of 
the enactment of the ADA and its sibling laws as a veil-of-ignorance moment. 
Members of Congress restricted the use of disability as a qualification for im-
portant benefits while accountable largely to members of the nondisabled public 
who did not know whether they would ever become disabled. That decision has 
more presumptive legitimacy than an ex post decision by those operating the 
healthcare system, who at that point know precisely who is and is not disabled, 
to place the burden of resource scarcity on disabled individuals—the very indi-
viduals who are most likely to have been excluded from such decisions. 
B. Does Defining the Qualification as “[Comparative] Ability to Benefit” Solve 
the Problem? 
1. The General Argument 
What if we were to take the concept of qualification up a level of generality? 
Defenders of disability-based rationing might say that the relevant qualification 
for medical treatment is not the absence of disability but the ability to benefit 
from the treatment. And just like blindness and the bus driver, perhaps disability 
in many circumstances just makes it impossible (given current technology) to 
benefit from a treatment. If a person has a pre-existing condition such as ad-
vanced cancer that will inevitably kill them in the next week, and they then ac-
quire coronavirus, is it sensible to say that they will benefit from ventilator treat-
ment for their new disease if they are going to die so soon anyway? Such a 
person, one might say, is not qualified for treatment for the new condition. 
And if we are in a triage situation, one might argue, the relevant qualification 
is not the ability to benefit in some absolute sense but the relative ability to ben-
efit. If there simply are not enough life-saving treatments to go around, might a 
healthcare provider reasonably determine that the people who should get those 
treatments are the ones who are likely to live the longest, or live the fullest lives, 
as a result of the treatment? What makes a person “qualified” for treatment, on 
this view, is that the treatment will offer that person a higher marginal number 
of life years or quality-adjusted life years than the next person. 
One might go further: perhaps one’s disability is relevant to that question 
even if one will not die immediately after receiving the treatment. If I have a pre-
existing medical condition that will cause me to die ten years after receiving a 
successful treatment for my coronavirus, maybe we should give the treatment 
 
39. Cf. John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 
727 (1974) (“[R]egardless of whether it is wise or unwise, it is not ‘suspect’ in a constitutional 
sense for a majority, any majority, to discriminate against itself.”). 
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instead to someone whose post-treatment life expectancy is longer. There is a 
widespread (though hardly universal) intuition that we should give scarce life-
saving treatments to younger people before we give them to older people.40 Per-
haps the same principle should apply when a pre-existing disability will predict-
ably shorten the post-treatment life of one patient vis-à-vis another. More con-
troversially, if I have a pre-existing medical condition that means that my life 
will be of a lower quality than that of another patient after receiving a successful 
treatment for my coronavirus, maybe we should give the treatment to the other 
patient. 
In times of extreme triage of specific treatments, these arguments of course 
deserve serious consideration. But there are substantial problems with them. 
One relates to democratic legitimacy. At any given moment, there is always scar-
city of all sorts of healthcare inputs.41 Even if, as the economists insist, scarcity 
is itself a basic fact of life, the pattern of which products and resources are scarce 
in any given place and time is significantly the result of societal decisions. That 
is especially true in the richest society in human history—one whose health sys-
tem has a well-documented problem of waste and inefficiency.42 As Frank 
Pasquale argues, “The current scarcity of care for the least well off is not a natural 
feature of the world; rather, it is epiphenomenal of repeated decisions not to im-
pose certain tax burdens today even though they would have seemed perfectly 
fair 50 years ago.”43 
Disabled people have a disproportionately small amount of input into deci-
sions about the operation of the health system. They are underrepresented 
among the ranks of health professionals who constitute the system, and they 
experience significant barriers to participating in the democratic process that 
regulates the system.44 A significant point of the disability discrimination laws is 
 
40. For a review of arguments for age-based rationing, see Smith & Rother, supra note 34, at 1852-
55. 
41. See, e.g., Dan Brock, Ethical Issues in the Use of Cost Effectiveness Analysis for the Prioritization of 
Health Resources, in HANDBOOK OF BIOETHICS: TAKING STOCK OF THE FIELD FROM A PHILO-
SOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE 353, 353 (George Khushf ed., 2004) (“Resources to improve health are 
and always have been scarce, in the sense that health must compete with other desirable social 
goals like education and personal security for resources.”). 
42. See, e.g., Austin Frakt, The Huge Waste in the U.S. Health System, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/07/upshot/health-care-waste-study.html [https:// 
perma.cc/5B5V-VCEB]. 
43. Frank Pasquale, The Hippocratic Math: How Much Should Society Spend on Health Care?, 32 J. 
LEGAL MED. 529, 535-36 (2011) (reviewing M. GREGG BLOCHE, THE HIPPOCRATIC MYTH: WHY 
DOCTORS ARE UNDER PRESSURE TO RATION CARE, PRACTICE POLITICS, AND COMPROMISE 
THEIR PROMISE TO HEAL (2011)). 
44. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text. 
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to rectify these sorts of inequalities by forcing institutions to take equal account 
of the interests of disabled people when they make their decisions. 
The perceived need to deny ventilators to coronavirus patients with pre-ex-
isting disabilities results not from scarcity as a natural fact, but from two societal 
decisions: first, the decision to fail to maintain an adequate stock of ventilators 
to serve all patients who would need them if a pandemic breaks out;45 second, 
the decision, once a pandemic breaks out, to use patients’ pre-existing disabili-
ties as a basis for denying them the use of those devices. A process in which peo-
ple with disabilities were equally represented vis-à-vis the nondisabled, and in 
which the interests of both groups were given equal concern, would not lead to 
both of these decisions. An equal process might instead have chosen to obviate 
the second decision by maintaining a sufficient stock of ventilators to serve every 
patient in the event of a pandemic. Or it might well have found the costs of such 
a policy to be extravagant when considered in light of the other possible uses of 
societal resources. But it would not then place all of the burden of that decision 
on individuals with pre-existing disabilities. The combination of both of these 
policies—allowing scarcity of ventilators, while imposing the life-or-death costs 
of that scarcity most heavily on disabled people—bespeaks a failure of demo-
cratic legitimacy. 
2. The Problem with Disability-Based Quality-of-Life Judgments 
Even if they did not pose these problems of distributive justice and demo-
cratic legitimacy, disability-based criteria are likely to rest on erroneous—or at 
least highly controversial—judgments about the life prospects of those with dis-
abilities. The point is most immediately obvious when considering quality-of-
life judgments.  
When medical professionals or others determine that a disability limits the 
quality of a person’s life, they are making a controversial normative judgment 
that often does not reflect the views of disabled persons themselves. “A massive 
body of research has demonstrated that people who acquire a range of disabilities 
typically do not experience much or any permanent reduction in the enjoyment 
 
45. See, e.g., Lena H. Sun, Inside the Secret U.S. Stockpile Meant to Save Us All in a Bioterror Attack, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2018, 6:00 AM EST), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-
your-health/wp/2018/04/24/inside-the-secret-u-s-stockpile-meant-to-save-us-all-in-a 
-bioterror-attack [https://perma.cc/HMH2-PNXS] (noting that the budget for the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention’s Strategic National Stockpile “hasn’t always been able to 
keep up with the program’s ever-growing list of needs”). 
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of life.”46 Elizabeth Emens has extensively detailed the differences between what 
she calls the “inside” and “outside” views of disability: 
 From the outside, disability commonly looks like an unhappy place cre-
ated by an individual medical problem for which the law sometimes pro-
vides special benefits to that individual. From the inside, disability often 
looks like a mundane feature of a no-less-happy life, rendered inconven-
ient or disabling largely by interactions with the surrounding environ-
ment, which legal accommodations alter in ways that sometimes provide 
benefits to many.47 
To choose the “outside” view of disability held by most nondisabled people 
over the “inside” view held by many disabled people themselves reflects a nor-
mative choice.48 That choice might result from the devaluation of life with a dis-
ability—something that seems to fly in the face of the disability discrimination 
laws’ guarantee of equal treatment. Or it might result from a form of paternal-
ism—an understanding that people without disabilities are better judges of the 
quality of a disabled life than are people with disabilities. “[P]aternalism has 
historically been one of the most significant contributors to the disadvantage 
people with disabilities experience.”49 And paternalism was a principal target of 
the disability discrimination laws.50 Given the well-documented evidence of bias 
by members of the medical profession against disability,51 we should be espe-
cially concerned that these judgments are being made in a way that suppresses 
disabled people’s interests and reinforces the problem of democratic legitimacy. 
To the extent that disabilities do harm the quality of one’s life, that is often 
because of discrimination and societal decisions that have rendered significant 
opportunities inaccessible.52 To use those harms as a justification for denying 
life-saving treatment to disabled people imposes a form of “double jeopardy.” 
 
46. Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation, and Disabil-
ity, 60 VAND. L. REV. 745, 763 (2007). 
47. Elizabeth F. Emens, Framing Disability, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1383, 1386. 
48. See Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 46, at 776 (“The assumed neutral baseline of non-dis-
ability is not, in fact, neutral; the preferences and experiences of people without disabilities 
are just as conditioned by their situations as are those of people with disabilities. Neither peo-
ple with nor those without disabilities have epistemic access to the “true” enjoyment of life 
with a disability.” (footnotes omitted)). 
49. Id. at 795. 
50. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Supreme Court, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Rational Dis-
crimination, 55 ALA. L. REV. 923, 932 n.70 (2004). 
51. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 31. 
52. See, e.g., Adrienne Asch, Distracted by Disability, 7 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 77, 80 
(1998). 
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Societal discrimination against people with disabilities causes them to experi-
ence less full lives, which social institutions then offer as a reason for making the 
further decision to deny these already-disadvantaged individuals essential ben-
efits.53 
Considerations like these led the HHS, in the George H.W. Bush Admin-
istration, to reject the 1992 Oregon health-reform plan. Oregon’s plan imple-
mented a form of rationing. HHS Secretary Louis Sullivan concluded that the 
rationing relied on quality-of-life surveys that “quantifie[d] stereotypic assump-
tions about persons with disabilities.”54 And when Oregon’s health commission-
ers conducted their own rankings of which conditions and treatments to priori-
tize, they relied on factors “including ‘quality of life’ and ‘ability to function’”—
factors that, in Sullivan’s view, “expressly value a person without a disability 
more highly than a person with a disability in the allocation of medical treat-
ment.”55 As a result, he concluded, the proposed rationing plan did not comply 
with the ADA.56 In line with Secretary Sullivan’s analysis, the ADA, Rehabilita-
tion Act, and ACA should be understood to prohibit the rationing of life-saving 
treatment based on judgments about the effects of disability on a person’s quality 
of life. 
3. The Problem with Disability-Based Quantity-of-Life Judgments 
What about future life expectancy? A recent article in the New England Jour-
nal of Medicine co-authored by a number of influential bioethicists agrees that 
the rationing of life-saving treatment should not take account of assessments of 
a patient’s future quality of life, but that it should rest on assessments of future 
quantity of life.57 At least outside of the case in which it is clear that a person’s 
 
53. See John Harris, QALYfying the Value of Life, 13 J. MED. ETHICS 117, 119-20 (1987). Harris’s 
version of the “double jeopardy” argument takes for granted that disability inherently limits 
the value of life. See id. at 120 (“The first disaster leaves her with a poor quality of life and 
QALYS then require that in virtue of this she be ruled out as a candidate for lifesaving treat-
ment, or at best, that she be given little or no chance of benefiting from what little amelioration 
her condition admits of.”). If one believes that disability does not inherently limit the value of 
life, but does so largely if not exclusively as a result of society’s treatment of people with disa-
bilities, the double jeopardy point becomes even more powerful. For criticism of Harris’s 
“double jeopardy” argument—albeit criticism that, like Harris, fails to appreciate the role of 
societal decisions in causing the harm attached to disability—see MCKIE ET AL., supra note 33, 
at 85-97. 
54. ADA Analyses of the Oregon Health Care Plan, 9 ISSUES L. & MED. 397, 410 (1994). 
55. Id. at 411. 
56. See id. at 409-12. For a discussion of the Oregon experience, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, The 
Americans with Disabilities Act as Risk Regulation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1479, 1507-09 (2001). 
57. See Emanuel et al., supra note 30. 
the yale law journal forum May 27, 2020 
16 
underlying disability will make them unable to benefit from coronavirus treat-
ment—either because that disability interferes with the treatment itself, or be-
cause the underlying disability will kill the individual in the very near term re-
gardless of the success of the treatment—consideration of the life-expectancy 
impact of the disability does not accord with the legal principles I have just dis-
cussed. 
The intuition that age is an appropriate rationing criterion might lead us to 
think that the expected quantity of life should be treated differently than the ex-
pected quality of life. We should recall, however, that even if many people agree 
that age is an appropriate criterion, not everyone does.58 Among those who do 
not are the HHS Office for Civil Rights, which recently declared that the Age 
Discrimination Act of 1975 prohibits treatment decisions founded on “judgments 
about a person’s relative ‘worth’ based on,” among other things, “age.”59 
Even if we focus on those who do agree that age is an appropriate criterion, 
it is far from clear that they hold that position because they believe health sys-
tems should maximize the number of life-years saved. Many people defend the 
use of age based on grounds that are backward rather than forward looking—
“the feeling that everyone is entitled to some ‘normal’ span of health (usually 
expressed in terms of life years, e.g. ‘three score years and ten’).”60 The implica-
tion is that “anyone failing to achieve this has in some sense been cheated, whilst 
anyone getting more than this is ‘living on borrowed time.’”61 On this view, we 
may legitimately deny treatment to people who have already had their “fair in-
nings” if that is necessary to protect others from being cheated out of the same 
opportunity.62 But that does not mean that we believe that “each life year is 
equally valuable,”63 or even that we should always prefer saving the younger per-
son to saving the older person. For example, one bioethicist who purports to 
“support age-related rationing for COVID-19 patients” argues that “when the 
demand outstrips the supply” of ventilators, those devices should not be given 
 
58. For an argument that the use of age as a medical-rationing criterion may violate the federal 
Age Discrimination Act, see Jessica Dunsay Silver, From Baby Doe to Grandpa Doe: The Impact 
of the Federal Age Discrimination Act on the “Hidden” Rationing of Medical Care, 37 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 993 (1988). 
59. Office for Civil Rights, supra note 11, at 1. 
60. Alan Williams, Intergenerational Equity: An Exploration of the ‘Fair Innings’ Argument, 6 HEALTH 
ECON. 117, 119 (1997). 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Sean Hannon Williams, Statistical Children, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 63, 103 (2013). 
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to patients who are eighty or older.64 He contends that “people who have reached 
that milestone have enjoyed an opportunity to live a complete life.”65 But that 
reasoning does not rest on the principle that the health system should maximize 
the expected-life years saved. For example, a “complete life” or “fair innings” 
principle would treat a twenty-five-year-old the same as a thirty-five-year-old, 
even though saving the younger patient would, all else equal, maximize the 
number of expected-life years. 
Moreover, reliance on expected number of years of survival as a justification 
for explicitly disability-based rationing raises many of the same concerns about 
democratic legitimacy, medical bias, and double jeopardy that reliance on qual-
ity-of-life measures does. Once again, we would be forcing disabled individuals 
to face deadly consequences because of societal decisions not to invest in suffi-
cient treatments—decisions from which people with disabilities disproportion-
ately lack access. Once again, we would be relying on medical judgments that are 
likely to be inflected by bias.66 And once again, we would be denying life-saving 
treatment at least in part because of societal discrimination—for discrimination 
against disabled individuals plays a key role in the poor health outcomes some 
of them experience.67 
Society does not, of course, universally endorse expected number of years of 
survival as a basis for discrimination in the provision of life-saving treatment. 
 
64. Franklin G. Miller, Why I Support Age-Related Rationing of Ventilators for Covid-19 Patients, 
HASTINGS BIOETHICS F. (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.thehastingscenter.org/why-i-support-
age-related-rationing-of-ventilators-for-covid-19-patients [https://perma.cc/8GHS-FZ4R]. 
65. Id. 
66. Medical professionals “often place too heavy a clinical focus on the disability, such that it ‘over-
shadows’ the acute reason for their visit.” Medical Futility and Disability Bias, supra note 31, at 
31, 71 n.81. Moreover, “few physicians have the expertise and training necessary to accurately 
diagnose and treat people with disabilities; often, they simply do not know how to apply di-
agnostic standards to people who physically or mentally deviate from the statistical norm, or 
they fail to differentiate the conditions associated with the individual’s disability from the 
acute symptoms behind their medical visit.” Id. at 31, 71 n.82. And in many situations, doctors 
“use functional limitations as a proxy for determining vital organ functioning,” which leads 
them to “misinterpret[]” the limitations attendant to disability as organ damage—a factor 
that could readily lead to an inaccurate prognosis for a disabled patient. Id. at 71 n.82. 
67. See Tara Lagu, Christine Griffin & Peter K. Lindenauer, Ensuring Access to Health Care for Pa-
tients with Disabilities, 175 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 157, 157 (2015) (“Patients with disabilities 
face barriers when they attempt to access health care. These barriers include physical barriers 
to entering health care establishments, lack of accessible equipment, lack of a safe method for 
transferring the patient to an examination table, and the lack of policies that facilitate ac-
cess.”); Silvia Yee et al., Compounded Disparities: Health Equity at the Intersection of Disability, 
Race, and Ethnicity 39 (2017), https://dredf.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Compounded 
-Disparities-Intersection-of-Disabilities-Race-and-Ethnicity.pdf [https://perma.cc/849K-
V36T] (“Negative attitudes toward and assumptions about disabilities have an adverse effect 
on the health and quality of health care for people with disabilities.”). 
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Nor should it. For example, there remains a gap in life expectancy between Af-
rican Americans and whites, despite real progress in recent years.68 There is also 
a substantial and growing gap between richer and poorer people.69 Yet few 
would defend rationing ventilators based on a patient’s race or wealth—even if 
it would be a good proxy for number of years of expected survival following 
treatment. We recognize that race and wealth are morally arbitrary for these pur-
poses, that minorities and poor people were disproportionately excluded from 
the decisions about how to invest in healthcare, and that requiring them to forgo 
life-saving treatment because of their groups’ poor life expectancy inflicts a kind 
of double jeopardy.70 The disability discrimination laws place disability on a sim-
ilar plane. 
In a forthcoming piece in this Journal, Govind Persad defends the use of dis-
ability-based criteria that may result in exclusion from life-saving care when 
those criteria are based on quantity-of-life, but not quality-of-life judgments.71 
He begins with a factual premise: people whose disabilities lead to deprioritiza-
tion under such exclusions are likely to make up a small minority of the overall 
population of people with disabilities who need treatment. Based on that prem-
ise, Persad argues that denying life-saving treatment to those whose disabilities 
will predictably shorten their post-recovery lives will be better for people with 
disabilities “as a group” than the alternatives. That is, he argues, because it will 
enable limited treatments to save more lives overall. Such triage practices “save[] 
more people with disabilities than random selection, even if people with disabil-
ities might—though this is debatable—comprise a greater proportion of the 
(smaller) number saved under random selection.”72 
 
68. See, e.g., Joel Achenbach, Life Expectancy Improves for Blacks, and the Racial Gap is Closing, CDC 
Reports, WASH. POST (May 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health 
/wp/2017/05/02/cdc-life-expectancy-up-for-blacks-and-the-racial-gap-is-closing [https:// 
perma.cc/EMZ6-X5G3] (“Blacks in every age group under 65 continue to have significantly 
higher death rates than whites. Black life expectancy at birth is about 3½ years lower than that 
of whites.”). 
69. See, e.g., Raj Chetty et al., The Association Between Income and Life Expectancy in the United 
States, 2001-2014, 315 JAMA 1750 (2016). 
70. For an analysis along these lines, that equates disability with other “personal characteristics” 
that could be used to justify “discriminat[ion] against . . . a class,” see Einer Elhauge, Allocat-
ing Health Care Morally, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1449, 1516, 1518 (1994). As Elhauge explains, if “a 
person’s medical disability were taken into account in determining that person’s right to treat-
ment for all other illnesses, then the claim of a form of double jeopardy would have consider-
able force. For then, having suffered the first illness, the person’s claim to all future medical 
treatment of other illnesses would be discounted.” Id. at 1516. 
71. See Govind Persad, Why Disability Law Permits Evidence-Based Triage in a Pandemic, 130 YALE 
L.J.F. (forthcoming June 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3571139 [https://perma.cc/DD2Y 
-FY4K]. 
72. Id. at 18. 
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But there are three problems with that argument. First, his factual premises, 
while in some respects plausible, are neither obvious nor proven. Whether or not 
more people with disabilities will benefit from a policy containing disability-
based exclusions depends on a comparison of the distribution of disabled people 
in two different groups. The first group is the population to whom the policy 
denies life-saving treatment. The second is the population to whom the policy 
provides life-saving treatment. Whether more people with disabilities will ben-
efit from the disability-based exclusion also depends on the resources (such as 
time occupying a scarce ventilator) that would be consumed by members of each 
population if they were to be provided treatment. The ADA’s definition of disa-
bility is broad, and Persad is surely correct that “the overwhelming majority of 
disabilities do not affect” either “patients’ prospect of benefit or the quantity of 
resources they need.”73 But the population that needs scarce life-saving treatment 
is unlikely to be drawn randomly from the underlying population. We thus can-
not know that a policy explicitly denying treatment to some individuals based 
on their disabilities is going to benefit more people with disabilities overall. 
Second, antidiscrimination laws protect individuals. An employer who re-
fuses to hire a woman for a particular job because she is a woman has illegally 
discriminated on the basis of sex even if it hires other women.74 A fair “bottom-
line” distribution of benefits and burdens across groups does not provide a de-
fense to proven explicit discrimination against an individual based on a protected 
category.75 That is a particularly important point in the context of the federal 
disability discrimination laws, where the definition of disability is so broad that 
it covers people with an immense variety of conditions.76 Maybe denying life-
saving treatment to individuals with cystic fibrosis could save more individuals 
who take daily medication for high blood pressure. Both of those conditions 
 
73. Id. at 6, 3. Citations to and quotations from Persad’s piece refer to the pre-publication version 
on SSRN as of the date of publication of this Essay. I cannot warrant that he will make no 
further changes after this Essay goes to print. 
74. See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 543 (1971) (per curiam) (concluding 
that a policy that used a sex-based distinction to exclude some women was discrimination 
under Title VII, even though “75-80% of those hired for the position [in question] were 
women”). The Phillips Court remanded for consideration of the bona fide occupational qual-
ification defense, see id. at 543-44, a defense that would have been irrelevant if the employer’s 
practice did not constitute sex discrimination under the statute. 
75. Indeed, the courts have rejected a bottom-line defense even in cases of disparate impact, where 
group-based outcomes are an essential part of the plaintiff ’s proof. See Connecticut v. Teal, 
457 U.S. 440 (1982). 
76. For discussions of the breadth of the definition of disability, see Kevin Barry, Toward Univer-
salism: What the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Can and Can’t Do for Disability Rights, 31 BERKE-
LEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 203 (2010); and Michelle A. Travis, Impairment as Protected Status: A New 
Universality for Disability Rights, 46 GA. L. REV. 937 (2012). 
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count as disabilities under the ADA and associated statutes. But it would be bi-
zarre to defend such a decision on the ground that it is better for disabled people 
“as a group.” The law provides no basis for such a defense. 
Finally, Persad’s argument depends on the existence of “evidence-based” as-
sessments of how a pre-existing disability affects life expectancy—and it de-
pends on the evidence being good. But the biases I discussed above should lead 
to great skepticism about the quality of the “evidence” supporting express disa-
bility-based exclusions or deprioritizations in a rationing plan. A key goal of the 
antidiscrimination laws is to counteract those sorts of biases. 
If it is clear that a person’s underlying disability will in fact interfere with the 
efficacy of the life-saving treatment, or that the person will die in the immediate 
term from that disability with or without that treatment, perhaps it is appropri-
ate to say that the individual is not qualified. Here we would be applying an ab-
solute criterion of benefit rather than the relative one that I explored and rejected 
above.77 But even here, humility should rule the hour. Medical professionals’ bi-
ases often lead them to make unduly negative prognoses regarding their disabled 
patients.78 Because disability rights law is designed significantly as a check on 
these biases, the law should not be read to permit health providers to make fu-
tility-of-treatment decisions for their disabled patients absent truly objective, 
persuasive, and reliable medical evidence. 
The “direct threat” defense that applies when an entity engages in disability 
discrimination to prevent a safety risk is instructive here. The law allows such 
discrimination based on a determination that the individual poses “a significant 
risk” that “cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation.”79 Such a deter-
mination must rest on “the most current medical knowledge and/or the best 
available objective evidence” and “an expressly ‘individualized assessment’” of 
the disabled person.80 The law imposes these constraints to provide a check on 
biases that lead to exaggerated fear of safety risks stemming from disability.81 
 
77. David Orentlicher endorses a rule like this one. See David Orentlicher, Destructuring Disability: 
Rationing of Health Care and Unfair Discrimination Against the Sick, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
49, 72-73 (1996) (“[I]f a disabling illness seriously compromises a person’s ability to benefit 
from an organ transplant, a physician could deny the person an organ. Otherwise, the physi-
cian should give the person the same opportunity as other candidates to benefit from a trans-
plant.”); see also Rai, supra note 29, at 1080-81 (arguing that medical resource-allocation de-
cisions should not take account of underlying disabilities “when the medical efficacy of the 
intervention is in no way related to the disability”). 
78. See supra notes 31, 66 and accompanying text. 
79. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (2018). 
80. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 86 (2002) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) 
(2001)). 
81. See id. at 85-86 n.5. 
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The widespread nature of medical bias against people with disabilities justi-
fies a similarly restrictive approach here. Absent a clear, objective basis for con-
cluding that a person will die in the immediate term as the result of a pre-existing 
disability—a determination that should be made through procedures that pro-
tect against bias—the law ought to be read to prohibit using such a disability as 
a basis for denying life-saving treatment that the person seeks.82 
This does not mean that medical systems must take a first-come, first-served 
approach to providing life-saving treatment in triage situations. As Secretary 
Sullivan explained in his response to the proposed Oregon plan, a system may 
consider “a wide range of factors” that are “consistent with the ADA.”83 “These 
factors include, but are not limited to, the cost of medical procedures, the length 
of hospital stays, prevention of death, and prevention of contagious diseases”—
and indeed “any content neutral factor that does not take disability into account 
or that does not have a particular exclusionary effect on persons with disabili-
ties.”84 If a system does not wish to follow that path, it may allocate treatments 
on a lottery basis—a process that many people believe would be fairer.85 But un-
der the best reading of the disability discrimination laws, they may not deny life-
saving treatment simply because a patient has a pre-existing disability. 
i i i .  the “baby doe” cases
My arguments here might seem inconsistent with an older line of lower-
court cases that rejected challenges to the withholding of medical treatment from 
82. In addition, the law’s requirements of reasonable modification and reasonable accommoda-
tion apply fully here. They should be understood to require medical systems to take steps to
ensure that those who are not qualified for life-saving treatments can become qualified. See 42
U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2018) (requiring “reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices,
the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of
auxiliary aids and services” where necessary to enable an individual to “meet[] the essential
eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities
provided by a public entity”); id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (discrimination includes “a failure to 
make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications
are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommoda-
tions to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such mod-
ifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations”); Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985) (stating that
“to assure meaningful access, reasonable accommodations in the grantee’s program or benefit
may have to be made” to comply with the Rehabilitation Act).
83. ADA Analyses of the Oregon Health Care Plan, supra note 54, at 411.
84. Id.
85. For a discussion of different approaches, see Sheri Fink, The Hardest Questions Doctors May 
Face: Who Will Be Saved? Who Won’t?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes
.com/2020/03/21/us/coronavirus-medical-rationing.html [https://perma.cc/HA27-ZYRG].
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newborns with developmental disabilities.86 Those cases, known as the “Baby 
Doe” cases, appear to hold that the disability discrimination laws cannot be em-
ployed to challenge medical treatment decisions. Although they have not been 
the subject of much academic discussion in recent years, they do occasionally pop 
up in litigation.87 Accordingly, it would not be surprising if a health system 
sought to defend a disability-based rationing decision by pointing to those cases. 
In the leading “Baby Doe” case, United States v. University Hospital, the Sec-
ond Circuit said that the Rehabilitation Act’s “otherwise qualified” language 
“cannot be applied in the comparatively fluid context of medical treatment deci-
sions without distorting its plain meaning.”88 The court asserted that “[i]n com-
mon parlance, one would not ordinarily think of a newborn infant suffering from 
multiple birth defects as being ‘otherwise qualified’ to have corrective surgery 
performed.”89 It determined that challenges to nontreatment decisions would 
“invariably require lengthy litigation primarily involving conflicting expert tes-
timony to determine whether a decision to treat, or not to treat, or to litigate or 
not to litigate, was based on a ‘bona fide medical judgment.’”90 And it concluded, 
based on a review of the legislative history, that “[C]ongress never contemplated 
that section 504 would apply to treatment decisions of this nature.”91 
But there are two significant problems with relying on the “Baby Doe” cases 
here: the cases are inconsistent with more recent Supreme Court decisions, and 
they do not apply here even on their own terms. 
As we have seen, in the year after University Hospital, the Court concluded in 
Choate that entities may not evade the bar on disability discrimination simply by 
turning the absence of a disability into a qualification for a benefit.92 By allowing 
hospitals to employ an infant’s disability as the basis for determining that the 
child was not “qualified” for medical treatment, that is precisely what the “Baby 
Doe” cases did. 
 
86. See Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487, 1493 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Univ. Hosp., 
State Univ. of N.Y., 729 F.2d 144, 156 (2d Cir. 1984). 
87. A relatively recent example is the Terri Schiavo case. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 
403 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2005). 
88. Univ. Hosp., 729 F.2d at 156. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 157. 
91. Id.; see also Johnson, 971 F.2d at 1493 (adopting the Second Circuit’s rule from University Hos-
pital). 
92. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985). 
who gets the ventilator? 
23 
The “Baby Doe” cases relied on the premise that the disability discrimination 
laws apply only in those contexts Congress specifically envisioned.93 But the Su-
preme Court decisively rejected that premise in Pennsylvania Department of Cor-
rections v. Yeskey.94 In Yeskey, the Court held that Title II of the ADA applies to 
discrimination against disabled individuals incarcerated in a state’s prison sys-
tem. Although the state argued that “Congress did not envisio[n] that the ADA 
would be applied to state prisoners,” the Court found that argument “irrele-
vant.”95 Even “assuming [the state’s argument] to be true,” the Court held, “the 
fact that a statute can be ‘applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Con-
gress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth.’”96 Because Title 
II applies to any disability-based discrimination by a “public entity,” without 
making a specific exception for prisons, the Court refused to read such an excep-
tion into the statute. That conclusion fatally undermines the premise of the 
“Baby Doe” cases. 
And contrary to the “Baby Doe” cases, the Supreme Court has now twice 
recognized that the disability discrimination laws apply in the “context of medi-
cal treatment decisions.”97 In Bragdon v. Abbott,98 the Court applied the ADA to a 
dentist’s refusal to treat a patient because she had HIV.99 And in Olmstead v. 
L.C.,100 the Court held that the ADA imposes significant obligations on states 
regarding the provision of mental health treatment. The Olmstead Court disa-
vowed any holding “that the ADA imposes on the States a ‘standard of care’ for 
whatever medical services they render, or that the ADA requires States to ‘pro-
vide a certain level of benefits to individuals with disabilities.’”101 But it specifi-
cally held “that States must adhere to the ADA’s nondiscrimination requirement 
with regard to the services they in fact provide.”102 
 
93. See Univ. Hosp., 729 F.2d at 157 (“Before ruling that congress intended to spawn this type of 
litigation under section 504, we would want more proof than is apparent from the face of the 
statute.”). 
94. 524 U.S. 206 (1998). 
95. Id. at 212 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
96. Id. (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985) (citation omitted)). 
97. Univ. Hosp., 729 F.2d at 156. 
98. 524 U.S. 624 (1998). 
99. The Court remanded for determination whether the dentist had a defense because treating 
the patient posed a “direct threat” to the health or safety of others in the dental office. See id. 
at 661-64. On remand, the First Circuit rejected the direct threat defense, and the Court de-
nied certiorari. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 163 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1131 
(1999). 
100. 527 U.S. 581 (1999). 
101. Id. at 603 n.14 (internally quoting Thomas, J., dissenting at 623-24). 
102. Id. 
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Notably, when the Supreme Court addressed the “Baby Doe” issue, in Bowen 
v. American Hospital Association,103 it did not embrace University Hospital’s posi-
tion that the Rehabilitation Act does not cover medical treatment decisions. Jus-
tice Stevens’s plurality opinion rested on a very narrow ground. He concluded 
that a hospital’s withholding of treatment to disabled infants did not violate the 
statute where the parents of those infants refused to consent to the treatment: 
“[W]ithout the consent of the parents or a surrogate decisionmaker the infant is 
neither ‘otherwise qualified’ for treatment nor has he been denied care ‘solely by 
reason of his handicap.’”104 Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment to 
make five votes for Justice Stevens’s bottom line, but he issued no opinion to 
explain his reasoning.105 
In Bowen, not a single Supreme Court Justice endorsed the Second Circuit’s 
University Hospital holding. And the Court’s subsequent cases stand in conflict 
with the Second Circuit’s decision. Those decisions do not provide a basis for 
exempting medical rationing from the disability discrimination laws. 
There is a second reason why the lower-court “Baby Doe” cases cannot save 
the discriminatory medical-rationing decisions that are being adopted in re-
sponse to the coronavirus pandemic. Those cases embraced a rule that the disa-
bility discrimination laws do not apply to a decision to deny treatment based on 
the disability itself being treated. The Second Circuit explained its position in Uni-
versity Hospital: “Where the handicapping condition is related to the condi-
tion(s) to be treated, it will rarely, if ever, be possible to say with certainty that a 
particular decision was ‘discriminatory.’”106 The Second Circuit’s argument was 
intuitive. If a disability is the reason why an individual needs the medical treat-
ment in the first place, how can the refusal to provide that treatment discriminate 
on the basis of disability? There is no comparator who lacks that disability who 
was being treated better. For this reason, the Tenth Circuit, in its case relying on 
University Hospital, specifically distinguished “hypothesized situations in which 
the handicap that forms the basis of the section 504 discrimination bears no re-
lation to the medical treatment sought but denied.”107 
The refusal to provide coronavirus treatment to patients with pre-existing 
disabilities is precisely the case that the Tenth Circuit distinguished. A pre-exist-
ing condition like a developmental disability “bears no relation to the medical 
 
103. 476 U.S. 610 (1986). 
104. Id. at 630 (plurality opinion) (quoting Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap; Proce-
dures and Guidelines Relating to Health Care for Handicapped Infants, 49 Fed. Reg. 1622, 
1636 (Jan. 12, 1984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 84)). 
105. See id. at 648 (“Chief Justice Burger concurs in the judgment.”) 
106. United States v. Univ. Hosp., State Univ. of N.Y., 729 F.2d 144, 157 (2d Cir. 1984). 
107. Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487, 1494 n.3 (10th Cir. 1992). 
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treatment”—a ventilator—that the challenged protocols will deny the disabled 
patient. Here, unlike the situation in which the courts believed themselves to be 
in the “Baby Doe” cases, the medical system’s action is the refusal to treat one 
condition based on an individual’s having a different disability.108 Even on their 
own terms, the “Baby Doe” cases do not bar application of the disability discrim-
ination laws here. 
conclusion 
Under the best reading of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Afforda-
ble Care Act, the denial of life-saving treatments to individuals who have a dis-
tinct pre-existing disability violates the law. In a true triage situation—one the 
coronavirus pandemic may soon present—it may be necessary for the medical 
system to make tragic choices about how to allocate scarce resources. But deny-
ing those treatments to individuals because of their disabilities, when those in-
dividuals can benefit from them, is not one of the choices the law permits.  
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108. I do not mean to endorse the way the “Baby Doe” courts described the cases before them. As
I have previously argued, there is ample basis to conclude that those cases in fact did involve
the refusal to treat one condition based on the child’s having a distinct disabling condition.
See SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, DISABILITY RIGHTS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 365 (2d ed. 2014) 
(“Based on the facts the Court presents, the baby needed surgery for spina bifida, but surgery 
was not performed because she also had microcephaly and hydrocephalus. The government’s
argument, as Judge Winter explains in dissent, was that other children with spina bifida 
would have received surgery, and that the reason Jane Doe did not receive that surgery was 
because of her other disabilities.”). Whether or not that conclusion is correct, the rule the
lower courts articulated in the “Baby Doe” cases does not, on its own terms, reach the coro-
navirus-inspired rationing of ventilators away from individuals with pre-existing disabilities.
